Universal composability is a framework for the specification and analysis of cryptographic protocols with a strong compositionality guarantee: UC protocols remain secure even when composed with other protocols. Secure compilation studies whether compiled programs are as secure as their source-level counterparts, no matter what target-level code they interact with. Although at present these disciplines are studied in isolation, we argue that there is a deep connection between them whose exploration will benefit both.
Introduction
Universal composability (UC) is a framework for the specification and analysis of cryptographic protocols with a key guarantee about compositionality [6, 7] . Several variations of UC exist [4, 11, 14, 17] but in this paper we focus on the original model of Canetti [6] . If a protocol is proven UC, that protocol behaves analogously to some high-level, secure-byconstruction ideal functionality no matter what the protocol interacts with. As such, if that protocol is used within a larger protocol, in order to reason about the latter, we can replace the former protocol with its ideal functionality and just reason about the rest. In other words, UC protocols are secure even when composed with other protocols. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. Conference'17, Washington, DC, USA © 2016 ACM. 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM. . . $15.00 DOI: 10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn Secure compilation (SC) is a discipline that studies how to prove that a compiler from a source to a target language preserves the security properties of source programs in the target programs it produces. Several criteria for secure compilation have been proposed in the literature, ranging from relational, equivalence-based notions [1, 21] to more recent notions based on preserving traces [2, 19, 20] .
While these two worlds seem to deal with quite different notions, we argue that they are deeply connected: both worlds are concerned with abstract notions (ideal functionalities, source programs) which are generally deemed secure, and more concrete notions (protocols, target programs) whose security must be proven against arbitrary opponents. What's more, proving that a protocol is UC, or that a compiler is secure, ensures that any attack at the concrete level (attacker, target program context) can be simulated at the abstract level (simulator, source program context).
We dig deeper into this analogy and show that there are benefits to be gained for both worlds by understanding their correspondence more deeply. After presenting UC and SC, this paper briefly outlines those benefits.
Universal Composability
We begin by briefly sketching how the UC framework is used. First, cryptographers craft a concrete cryptographic protocol Π of interest, for example, a key-agreement and message transmission protocol like TLS [10] . In order to prove that Π is UC (Π ⊢ UC F), they must come up with an ideal functionality F that (a) is secure by construction-in this example, a secret channel-and (b) such that Π is at least as secure as F. What is key here is that the behaviour of Π is given with respect to malicious attackers A that try to violate the cryptographic guarantees of Π. The ideal functionality, on the other hand, exists in a secure world where it interacts with "safe" attackers S that cannot break the ideal functionality. Roughly speaking, a UC proof demonstrates that it is possible to reduce any A to some S, effectively showing that any possible adversarial behaviour against Π in the real world is also possible against F in the secure world. Because the secure world is secure by construction, the protocol must be secure in the real world.
The behaviour of protocols, ideal functionalities and attackers is observed by an environment Z that outputs a boolean value 0/1 representing some abstract observation. Intuitively, if Z's output is the same in both worlds, its observations of (Π, A) and (F, S) match. However, since protocols deal with elements such as keys, which are guessable finite bitstrings, allowing all possible attackers would break any scheme. To sidestep this issue, Z's outputs in the two worlds must be the same except with very small probability (≈), and attackers must be polynomially bounded.
We can formalise UC as follows [6] . A key result of UC is that we can reason about protocols compositionally. Thus, if Π 1 ⊢ UC F 1 and we also have a larger protocol Π big that uses Π 1 inside (Π big [Π 1 ]), then we can just reason about the larger protocol using the ideal functionality instead (Π big [F 1 ]). This simplifies the reasoning process: the Π 1 sub-part is secure, since it behaves like F 1 .
Robust Compilation
Recent developments in secure compilation have created a set of criteria that preserve classes of hyperproperties (read, arbitrary program behaviours [8] ) dubbed robust compilation [2] . These criteria (like previous secure compilation criteria [1, 5, 19, 21] ) are robust, i.e., they talk about arbitrary target-level attackers that compiled code is linked against. Our candidate from the robust compilation set is Robust Hyperproperty-Preserving Compilation (RHC), whose formal definition is given below. A compiler satisfying RHC produces compiled code that upholds the same hyperproperties as its source-level counterpart. Informally, a compiler satisfies RHC if, no matter what target-level program context (∀A) the compiled code ( P ) is linked against (⊲⊳) 1 the target behaviour ( t) can also be reproduced ( t) by the source program (P) linked with (⊲⊳) a source-level program context (∃A). Formally, RHC is defined as follows:
To make the connection with UC clearer, below is a diagrammatic representation of RHC. We invite the reader to compare it with the UC diagram presented before. 1 We do not use the more conventional programming-language notation for plugging a program in a context, namely A [P], to draw a neater analogy with UC. Effectively, these two notations are equivalent: A [P] and A ⊲⊳ P.
A Bridge Between Two Worlds
At this point, we start to see a connection between the two worlds: it looks like all elements from each system exist in the other. We capture this intuition in the table below.
UC SC protocol Π P compiled program concrete attacker A A target context ideal functionality F P source program simulator S A source context environment, output Z, 0/1 t, trace, semantics communication ↔ ⊲⊳ linking probabilistic equiv.
≈ ⇐ ⇒ trace equality human translation Π → F · : P → P compiler While most of this table should, at this point, not be surprising, we want to focus on the final line, since our primary insights revolve around it.
While decades of work has yielded automated tools to generate binaries for our computers in the form of compilers, the same is far from true for cryptographic protocolsand devising ideal functionalities for complex cryptographic protocols by hand is a tedious and error-prone process. But the above analogy suggests that secure compilation may point the way towards generating concrete cryptographic protocols from high-level specifications, much like binaries are created from high-level programming languages. This would have a plethora of benefits, a few of which we list below. First, secure compilation for cryptography would open the development of new cryptographic protocols to a broad audience. Second, having compilers for cryptographic protocols would let us draw upon years of knowledge in proof mechanisation, both to mechanise UC proofs and to automate the secure implementation of cryptographic protocols (along the lines of CompCert [16] and CakeML [13] ).
Finally, UC proofs are often very complex, and that complexity is in fact a major hurdle for widespread adoption of the framework. For example, it took years and several unsuccessful attempts to prove results for cryptographic primitives as seemingly basic as digital signatures [3] and symmetric encryption [15] (a particular challenge is the definition of polynomial runtime bounds [12] ). Fortunately, recent advances in proving compilers secure have given us well-understood proof techniques called backtranslations [2, 9, 18, 20 ]-and we believe these techniques can be employed to rigorously and automatically generate UC proofs.
On the other side, reasoning about composition for securelycompiled programs may lead to new insights for SC. Consider some securely-compiled code P1 A linked with other securely compiled code P2 B . What this entails at the level of the resulting program P1 A ⊲⊳ P2 B is unknown, because each compiled program may be proven secure in the sense of preserving a distinct class of hyperproperties. We believe that insights from the UC world will help us reason about securely-compiled program composition.
